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Showing posts with label editorial with vocab november pdf hindu editorial. Show all posts
Showing posts with label editorial with vocab november pdf hindu editorial. Show all posts

Sunday, August 13, 2017

RANCOUR



   Rancour(n)(विद्वेष): Rancour is a feeling of                          bitterness and anger,bitterness or resentfulness,              especially when long standing



  synonyms: bitterness, spite, hate, hatred, resentment, malice, ill will, malevolence, malignancy, animosity, antipathy, enmity, hostility, acrimony, venom, poison, vindictiveness, balefulness, vengefulness, vitriol, virulence, perniciousness, meanness, nastiness

uses: There was no rancour, no bitterness.
               - Six years ago, the post-match formalities were conducted indoors in an atmosphere of bitterness and rancour.

Hitherto

Hitherto (Adj)(अब तक ):  it used in negative statement to describe a situation that has existed up to this point or up to the present time

synonyms:previouslyformerly, earlier, so far, thus far, beforebeforehand, to date, as yet; 
until now, until then, up until now, up until then, till now, till then, up to now, up to then

uses:
It's too much of a stretch that the golden city was hitherto undiscovered, despite being half a mile from a village.


.
This was the most glorious day which I have hitherto seen.



Interlocutor

Interlocutor (N)(वार्ताकार) : Interlocutor derives from the Latin interloqui, meaning "to speak between" or "to issue an interlocutory decree." (An interlocutory decree is a court judgment that comes in the middle of a case and is not decisive.) it means a person who takes part in a dialogue or conversation

Synonyms: middle man person, mediator, intermediate



Saturday, June 24, 2017

EXPUNGE




Expunge (V):- to eliminate completely; remove by erasing or crossing out or as if by drawing a line.

Synonyms: excise, scratch, strike

Uses:- -I would like to expunge my ex-husband from my memory.
-The president has the power to expunge any person’s criminal history in order to give that individual a fresh start in life

When I received the diamond ring from my husband, I felt the need to expunge any anger I previously felt towards him.    

Sunday, October 16, 2016

No proof required: A data dependent MPC


The recent decision by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to lower the repo rate by 25 bps to 6.25 per cent has been met with criticism and skepticism(doubt,संशयवाद). Some analysts have gone as far as to assert that there has been faulty judgment.
This criticism and commentary is all part of a healthy democratic system. Also fair is that some critics (like myself) find fault with the criticism of the critics, and even find it unfair. As it happens, I also think that the RBI-MPC is unnecessarily using some very faulty tools. Just to put my cards on the table, I believe that the MPC and RBI Governor Urjit Patel have reached the best decision that was possible with the data they had. Historically, except for occasional lapses, the RBI has been a data dependent institution, and it is encouraging to see that the tradition is being strongly reinforced(strengthen,मजबूत) by the MPC.
Questioning of the MPC decision has proceeded along the following lines: First, and most importantly, that the inflation rate is too high to warrant a rate cut. The last four year-on-year headline inflation numbers have been as follows: 5.5 (April 2016), 5.8, 6.1 and 5.1 per cent (August 2016). The target of the RBI is five per cent for March 2017. So how can the MPC cut rates now, and that also with a unanimous(united,एकमत) vote?
Surely, and unlike Raghuram Rajan, the MPC is giving in to political pressure (Ministry of Finance) and major corporates (who always want interest rates to be cut). Further, the MPC is emphasising growth over inflation, that is, they have all turned doves.
It is likely that the unfortunate manner in which Rajan was not reappointed is colouring perceptions and interpretations of many commentators. For the fact remains that rather than being different than Rajan, the MPC (and Patel and RBI) are doing what Rajan would have done. How do we know that?
We know that from the second criticism by the “experts”. A popular conclusion of the experts is that the RBI has softened because it has reduced the real policy rate range from 1.5-2 per cent to 1.25 percent, that is the RBI was now targeting a 1.25 percentage points gap between the repo rate and CPI inflation. This was articulated(expressed,उल्लेख) by MPC RBI member Michael Patra in the press conference following the MPC decision.
So the experts are right in stating that the real policy rate is now 1.25 per cent.
But the experts are very wrong in deducing(conclusion,निष्कर्ष) that this is a change in policy. Look at the following headline after the June policy meeting of the RBI under Rajan: “Will have room to cut rates if inflation stays at 5 per cent” (IE, June 9). The article goes on to quote Rajan: “If we get confident of achieving five per cent inflation target by March 2017, then we will get more space to cut.” What the RBI and MPC did on October 4 was a continuation of the RBI policy. There has been enough data on food prices, especially of pulses (and fruits and vegetables), to suggest that the next six-month course of such prices is at best stable at current levels, and likely to be lower because of the influence of good weather and increased acreage, and prospects of higher yields(return,मुनाफा), for an “inflation-elastic” crop like pulses.
This assessment, and forecast, has no relationship with being dovish, or looking at growth more than inflation, or giving in to the demands of industrialists and/or the Ministry of Finance. Indeed, if the MPC members had not unanimously agreed to cut rates, they would likely have had egg (and worse) on their faces next week when the CPI data for September is scheduled to be released — a figure around 4.3 per cent year-on-year headline inflation will not be entirely surprising. The simple point is all of us are rightly expecting the MPC to be responsible — and when they do act responsibly, by cutting rates in the face of considerable evidence, let us not besmirch(disgrace,गन्दा) their honour, or intelligence, by attributing to them false motives.
But the MPC has room to improve. A central feature of all inflation targeting regimes, and all bankers, and all economists, is that the key to lowering inflation rates is the lowering of inflation expectations. In the case of already low inflation, the goal is to keep expectations stable. And as we now know for some developed economies (Japan, Europe), the key to successful monetary policy is to raise inflationary expectations.
In the first MPC-RBI policy statement, one finds the following statement on inflationary expectations, and how important and influential they are: “Households reacted to the recent hardening of food inflation adaptively and raised their inflation expectations in the September 2016 round of the Reserve Bank’s inflation expectations survey of households.”
Given the importance of inflationary expectations, one would think, and believe, that central bankers would strive to make sure that they measure properly such expectations. Or at least measure them to the best of their ability. It is not clear that the RBI has ever fulfilled this mandate. In January 2015, at the beginning of this rate-cut cycle, the RBI cited(mentioned,उल्लेख)the results of its most recent inflation expectation survey (RBI-IES, December 2015), as supportive of a rate cut (25 bps from 8 to 7.75 per cent). This survey had shown a decline in one year forward expectations to 9.3 per cent from 13.5 per cent at the end of the previous quarter (September 2015). I had this to say: “Since when was high expectation of inflation of nine per cent low enough to warrant a rate cut? I fully agree that interest rates should be cut — but not because a junk RBI survey shows a decline in inflation expectations to a high nine per cent level. Better to junk junk than to offer it as an explanation — it makes all of us look bad”.
One and a half years later, and with an MPC in place, there is no change in this one bad habit of the RBI — the bad habit of using a junk survey, a junk result, to justify its otherwise very sound reasoning. Don’t take my word, or believe me, but do peruse(think,सोचना) the chart. There are two lines in the chart — actual year-on-year CPI inflation for each quarter, and the year ago forward expectation for the same quarter. For example, at the time Rajan cited the junk survey in January 2015, year-on-year inflation in 2014Q4 was 4.1 per cent. The forecast of the junk survey for this same quarter was 13.5 per cent!
Note also that there is no learning by doing on the part of the survey respondents. As inflation has declined, the forecast error (gap between forecast and actual) has widened, and to a near double-digit magnitude. It is intellectually embarrassing to even report these data, let alone use it.
The MPC is a new and progressive institution. The reasoning behind the vote, and the vote, of each MPC member will be made public 14 days after each meeting. We already know that it was a unanimous vote to cut. Let us hope that none of the members cite junk inflationary expectations.

courtesy:indian express
click here for official link

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Not simply a vision thing


Monsanto recently decided that it would stop the release of new genetically modified (GM) cotton technology because of “uncertainty in the business and regulatory environment”. At the same time, it was reported that GM mustard has moved closer to obtaining clearance for commercial cultivation in India following a key committee’s favourable assessment on issues of soil suitability and risks to health and ecology.
The issues involved are complex and contested(controversial,विवादास्पद), and the challenges and contradictions(protest,विरोधाभास) may be evident to even the most casual of observers. Bt brinjal itself may have faded away from public discourse but the debacle(failure,पराजय) over its introduction is not something that will be forgotten in a hurry. The contestations over Bt cotton continue to be alive in scientific research, in experiences on the field, and in policy debates. The seed industry has, in fact, split down the middle over a reorientation of the regulatory and policy frameworks related to Bt cotton. And yet, for a certain prominent section of the science and technology (S&T) establishment of the country, the promise of GM mustard trumps all skepticism(doubt,संदेह).
Contestations

The conundrum(puzzle,
पहेली) here is not so much about the technology itself as it is about the promise that imbues the technology and which holds the present and the future together. Building promises is very similar to building facts, notes Cynthia Selin who studies the intersection of science, technology and society. It is the promise and vision of the future that then becomes key in generating a constellation(planet,नक्षत्र) that provides social and political legitimacy on the one hand, and much-needed financial resources on the other. Bt cotton, Bt brinjal and many technologies of the future exist through the expectations they generate and mobilise about the future. The act of developing a technology, therefore, is as much work inside the laboratory as it should be of engaging with the state and society and with their various concerns and questions. This will not be possible if the public is seen as ignorant or ill-informed, and the activist reactionary or an agent of vested(inherent,निहित) interests. The contestation is, in fact, over the vision of S&T, of society and, for that matter, of the future itself.
In the case of GM mustard, work was done at Delhi University using public money provided by the government. And yet it needed the Central Information Commissioner to say that biosafety data around GM organisms should be available in the public domain. There are some key questions here. What explains, for instance, this deficit of trust in the public and in democratic mechanisms set up by the very institutions that provide the resources and the legitimacy for these new technologies? Is it an anxiety about failure of the technologist or of the technology itself? Or is it about the stakes involved in the socio-technical-economic system that has been mobilised to create the legitimacy in the first place? Does it say something about the potential failure of an imaginary technology that is based exclusively on the promise of the future? Can the narrative be one of hope and promise alone with no space for doubt or the possibility of any failure at all?
Technology Vision 2035

This indeed is the premise one sees embedded in India’s Technology Vision 2035 (TV 2035), a vision produced by the Technology Information, Forecasting and Assessment Council (TIFAC), an autonomous organisation under the Department of Science and Technology. Released earlier this year by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, TV 2035 charts out trajectories for society through various technologies that will help make India a ‘developed’ country by 2035. The vision is both an account of a future and a route to that future where technology delivers, provides and secures. Risk and vulnerabilities(weakness,
कमज़ोरिया) that are inherent to technology and therefore to our increasingly ‘technological cultures’, as Professor Wiebe Bijker, sociologist of science and technology, calls them, are part of the narrative in only a very marginal manner. There is little, if any, doubt about the capacity of technology and the different technologies to deliver the goods. TV 2035 sees people opposed to certain technologies like nuclear and big dams as a barrier to their dreams. These then need to be addressed through better governance and not better technological design because “bottlenecks(problemबाधा) lie in policy and not technology”.
The past and the present, we know, are full of various dilemmas(uncertainty,दुविधा), challenges, even failures of technological promises and yet, a substantive engagement with the ethical, legal and social (ESLA) issues of research, development and deployment of technology is conspicuous(specific,विशिष्ट) by its virtual absence.
When failure and risk are integral parts of the technological enterprise, why is it that technological visions like TV 2035 have such little space for including and discussing them? It may not be a conscious choice, but it is not an innocent one either. The particular question here is not whether GM mustard is acceptable, which is a rather different debate. The point is to note that the promise and the promissory visible frontstage in advocating a GM mustard is complemented by a vision backstage that is reluctant(unwilling,अनिच्छुक) or perhaps unable to look at anything but that promise. The ideal of the democratic in scientific and technological choices, while desirable, is certainly not an easy one to realise because the messy issues of the ethical, legal and social have to be dealt with both frontstage and backstage.
Political and democratic promise

An illustration of this is visible in a situation where the technological only appears marginal at first glance. On a visit to Kashmir, a conciliatory Home Minister Rajnath Singh offered to engage with anyone who was interested in finding a solution to the crisis there. “I will be staying at the Nehru Guest House. Those who believe in Kashmiriyat, Insaniyat and Jamhooriyat are welcome,” he tweeted in an effort to reach out to all. It was as much an invocation of the political and the democratic promise as it was of the technological promise of modern communications. The irony only came forth when he was asked how this message of the Home Minister would reach the people when the government itself had blocked Internet services.
What more can one say of the inextricable(complex,विकट) intertwining of the political and the technological with the social, legal and ethical? The technological has promise, no doubt, but it is not untethered to chart territories of its own making.

courtesy:the hindu
click here for official link



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Wednesday, October 12, 2016

DOWNLOAD MONTHLY PDF OF SEPTEMBER

 Now you can download monthly pdf of SEPTEMBER month.these articles are not only for english but also it will expand your current affairs.this ebook also contains exclusive articles from know your english.




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Saturday, October 1, 2016

The bane of a bumper crop


Every day, around 3 p.m., hundreds of lorries loaded with onions queue up at the new agricultural market complex at Lasalgaon, around 45 km from Nashik, waiting for the afternoon auction to begin.
As a group of traders approach, the farmers drop their produce at their feet, as if to tempt them into bidding high. The traders halt and look over the merchandise. A market committee employee calls out the reserve price: “400!” Eyes roll, unspoken words seem to pass between the traders. Then the bidding starts: “1!” “11!” “13!” “17!” In less than 30 seconds, the auction is over. The farmer gets 17 rupees over the reserve price, Rs.417 per quintal (100 kg). A pittance(small amount,अल्प भाग) at any given time, more so now when compared to prices last year.
A trader-controlled market

No matter how united the farmers are, no matter how hard they fight for a better price, they turn into mute spectators in front of the traders when auction begins. The auction is dictated by the traders with money and considerable political clout. Traders decide the price, farmers accept it without protest.
The market complex has a huge parking space for the lorries. Sometimes there are up to 1,000 vehicles at a time. The otherwise deserted place comes alive twice a day. The first auction of the day starts at around 10 a.m. and the second at 3 p.m. Depending on the number of vehicles, the auction can stretch from an hour to three hours.
Once the rate is fixed, the group of traders moves immediately to the next vehicle. The farmer, left with the price decided by the group, starts collecting the onions he has dropped on the ground. An official from the market committee approaches him with a receipt, bearing the auction rate, trader’s name and farmer’s name. With a receipt in hand and onions in the vehicle, the farmer then proceeds to the godown where the weighing process takes place. As per the rules laid down by the market committee, the farmer must get the payment before the end of the day, which is largely followed.
After the produce is dropped off at a shed in the complex, the traders take control of it. Workers start segregating(separate,अलग) the onions according to the quality and the packaging begins. Vehicles are loaded with the produce to be sent off to cities or to different States. Traders then get into a huddle to firm up the retail price of the produce — adding their profits — with nary a concern for the farmer and the price demanded by him. The operation is bloodless and smooth.
Barely breaking even

While onion is one of the major crops in this belt, farmers also cultivate grapes, soya bean, sugarcane, and ginger. Speaking out against the cartel of traders is not easy when the farmer is dependent largely on the onion crop, as it may result in traders ganging against him (or her) by dropping rates for his produce.
Official data from the Lasalgaon Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) says that this year’s prices — between Rs.500-Rs.800/ql., down from Rs.970-Rs.3,786/ql. — are the lowest in the last five years. This year, Rs.1,020/ql. (in June) was the highest rate given to farmers, compared to Rs.6,326/ql. in 2015-16, and Rs.2,626 in 2014-15.
Growing onions costs between Rs.50,000 and Rs.80,000 per acre, and a cultivated acre yields(give,देना) not more than 100 ql. With this year’s average selling price at Rs.728/ql., an acre’s worth of onions would get the farmer around Rs.72,800. This sees some farmers barely break even; many lose money.
Small wonder that Milind Darade, who owns 13 acres of land, is furious(angry,गुस्सा). “This is the only industry where producers have no right to decide the price of their product,” the onion farmer from Karanjgaon, Nashik district, says. “Isn’t it cruel? Shouldn’t we get angry?” The week before The Hindu caught up with him at the Saikheda sub-market committee, Darade was given a humiliating price for his produce: Rs.5/ql., or 5 paisa/kg. If that was not bad enough, Maharashtra’s Minister for Co-operation, Subhash Deshmukh, said on a live television show that his onions were rotten. “Let me give you some information,” he says indignantly(angrily,गुस्से से), “this is the onion you eat at a restaurant. Just peel off two layers and you would wonder whether it was really rotten.”
Darade has preserved the official paper from the market committee with the offered rate; he has laminated it to ensure it doesn’t get dog-eared. He says that he was so angry that he refused to sell his onions and brought the load, some 10-11 ql., back to his farm to use as fertiliser. But, he says, “When I calmed down, it dawned upon me that I must use it to highlight the plight of onion farmers.”
Supply-demand mismatch

Simplistically put, there was a shortage last year, and this year has seen record onion cultivation. Abundant(plentiful,प्रचुर) supply has brought the prices down. The farmers, though, are used to this kind of fluctuation. They don’t blame the bumper crop and supply-demand equation; they say it’s the traders who are conspiring(plot,साजिश) against them and the government has done little — or the wrong things — to help.
To understand the current crisis for farmers, we need to step back a little.
India has three onion crops a year. Early kharif (the crop sowed in the monsoon) onions come to market between October and December. Onions from the rangda, or late kharif, crop arrive from January to March. The winter or rabi crop is up for sale from April to May. Usually, some parts of the rabi crop are stored for a few months to fill the gap from May to October. Traditionally, prices rise from July to October; official data show that wholesale rates rise by as much as Rs.1,000/ql., even Rs. 1,500, later reflected in the retail market with an increase of Rs.5-Rs.10/kg for consumers.
In 2014-15, the onions took a hit following a hailstorm in North Maharashtra which, in turn, affected their storage value. With many rotting, the onions that did make it to market commanded high prices.
Then the drought of the summer just past played a role too; many sugarcane farmers switched to the less thirsty onion this year. “The onion cultivation area in the State has almost doubled in year 2015-16,” says Nanasaheb Patil, Director, National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India Ltd. (NAFED). “Farmers hoped that they will get last year’s rate — close to Rs.3,000-Rs.4,000/ql. — which did not happen, as production increased in huge proportions.”
India is the world’s second-largest onion producer (after China) with 26.79 per cent of the planet’s land under onion cultivation and 19.90 per cent of its production. Maharashtra is India’s largest producer, with a 32.45 per cent share of total onion production, and in turn, Nashik district in north Maharashtra accounts for with 41 per cent of the State’s onion harvest. According to the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCIS), India produced 203.33 lakh metric tonnes (MT, 1,000 kg) of onions in 2015-16, up from 189.28 lakh MT in 2014-15. Lasalgaon, Asia’s biggest onion market, received around 32,680 MT in the previous fiscal year. Five months into this year, it has received 10,874 MT.
To make matters worse for Maharashtra’s farmers, other States — notably Gujarat, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka — have reported higher onion yields.
Holding on for a better day
Aside from the production glut(overload,भरमार), another important factor was a 40-day strike by traders in July and August, opposing the State government’s decision to free agricultural market committees from government regulations. With no outlet for their rabi onions, farmers had no option but to store them and wait for the strike to end. In addition, thanks to the low prices, some farmers are choosing to not bring their onions to the markets, and instead are storing them away hoping an artificial scarcity(shortage,कमी) later in the year will pay off for them.
This strategy, however, comes with its own dangers: that of the crop rotting or the onions sprouting. Malti Bodke of Bhuse village points to her rotten onions with disgust. “How long can we store them? It’s been almost four months. Once the onions start sprouting, they lose weight, and it becomes difficult to get a higher price.”
The farmers also say that the traders are colluding(plot,षड्यंत्र) to cheat them. “It’s a cartel of traders which decides the rates and once the market reopened, they ensured prices didn’t cross Rs.1,000/ql.,” says Rajaram Fafale, from Maralgoi village.
The strike gets blame for the glut. But did trade actually stop? Officials and traders seem to want consumers to believe that, but farmers say it never really stopped. Darade says that opportunistic traders discreetly(carefully,सावधानी से) approached farmers and “quoted lowest possible rates. Farmers, thinking it was better to sell, even at a low price, rather than keep them and let them rot, did sell”.
Three years ago, when the farmers were getting Rs.4,500-Rs.5,000/ql., retail onion prices reached Rs.90/kg., which resulted in protests from the then-opposition parties, as well as consumer organisations, in Delhi, Mumbai and other major cities, accusing the United Progressive Alliance government of failing to protect consumers.
The government’s first step was to increase the Minimum Export Price (MEP) to $1,150/MT. This made it difficult for Indian exporters to compete in international markets; whatever stock was available was diverted to the domestic market, which brought prices down. By March 2014, when the late kharif crop got to market, prices had dropped to less than Rs.1,000/ql. in the wholesale market, and consumers got theirs at Rs.20-Rs.25/kg.
This may have played out well for consumers, but has had other consequences(result,परिणाम) for the industry. “There is absolutely no consistency in our approach towards onion exports,” says NAFED’s Patil. A look at MEPs between December 2010 and December 2015 bears him out: the figure has fluctuated wildly, dropping to $0 in May 2012, and with a high of $1,150 in November 2013. “It only enrages our customers overseas,” says Patil. “They are left with absolutely no guarantee of quantity and price of onions exported from India. These customers have instead chosen Pakistan, China and Iran, and we have lost guaranteed markets.”
Patil says that the government’s decision to placate(calm,शांत) enraged(angry,नाराज़) urban customers has lost it both its farmers’ support and its overseas markets. The onion, he says, is no longer an agricultural commodity, it has become a political symbol.
An MSP for onions?

Assuming the government has to balance the needs of consumers with those of producers, what else could it have done to ensure that farmers get some return on their labour?
The National Horticulture Research & Development Foundation (NHRDF) keeps track of potential harvests by collecting information on each district. This year, despite being aware of the possibility of a bumper crop, the government appears to have failed to take any measures to protect farmers. The NHRDF’s estimates say the rabi onions should be selling at around Rs.818/ql., which is significantly higher than what farmers are managing to get. If the government chose to use its Price Stabilisation Fund, it could subsidise the crop, paying, say, Rs.500/ql.
What the State government has announced this week by way of relief — Rs.100 per quintal, up to a maximum of 200 quintals, or a maximum of Rs.20,000 — has, to put it mildly, failed to enthuse farmers. Every farmer The Hindu spoke to called the measure not just inadequate(insufficient,अपर्याप्त) but practically a mockery of their plight.
Fafale, who sold 10 ql. at Lasalgaon for Rs. 220/ql., or Rs 2.2/kg., greeted the news with scorn. “Now I will get one rupee more. What a relief!” he says sarcastically. “We aren’t begging in front of the government. What we are asking is our right. How does this government conclude that this much of money is sufficient as financial aid? Who advises them? Have they bothered to check the ground reality?”
One of the major demands the farmers have is for the government to introduce a Minimum Support Price (MSP) for onions, as it has for sugarcane. “Why don’t the officers understand that we are not independent and traders enjoy a free run here?” says Darade. “Unless an MSP is announced, we cannot be sure of a certain minimum profit. Why this neglect?”
Western Maharashtra, the State’s sugar belt, has seen, in recent times, sugarcane farmers agitating(incite,उत्तेजित for an increased MSP. It became an electoral issue in 2014 when the Congress and the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) suffered major defeats in the Assembly polls in the region considered a bastion for both.
The Swabhimani Shetkari Sanghatana (SSS; its name means ‘organisation for farmers’ self-respect’), led by Raju Shetti, which was in the thick of the agitation, is now part of the State government and Shetti is an MP. While the SSS has stage limited protests in the State’s onion belt demanding an MSP, it has not been able to take the protests to a wider audience. With the Bharatiya Janata Party-Shiv Sena regime, as with the previous Congress-NCP rule, the MSP for onions issue is far from being solved.
In the village of Bhuse, Ramdas Bodke, 65, is philosophical. “I have seen many seasons and farming has never been easy. We know how to tackle nature. What do we do with man-made problems? We farmers feed the world, but now we wonder whether we will have food cooked at home.” He lapses into silence for a minute, and then his tone turns bitter: “Did the government discuss its proposal to hike MLA salaries for even a day? The government takes an instant decision to increase the salary of MLAs, but it takes a long time to decide about farmers. This is injustice. But there is no one to give justice to farmers.”
As for the urban consumers and their agitations, farmers mince no words when the topic comes up for discussion. Turning towards me, one of them asks, “You get agitated when prices skyrocket, but have you ever wondered what happens when prices hit rock bottom? Why don’t you come out on the streets demanding a fair price for us?”
courtesy:the hindu

Tuesday, September 6, 2016

Do we need a minimum wage law?


+In April this year, Union Labour Minister Bandaru Dattatreya announced that thegovernment will raise the minimum wage for contract workers to Rs.10,000 per month. It would do so, he said, through an executive order. The executive order never came. What did, however, were news reports on industry’s opposition to the proposal. In July, the proposal had been shelved.
This week, in a bid to get trade unions to call off their All India strike on September 2, the governmentagain announced a hike in minimum wages, but only for unskilled non-agricultural workers, from Rs.246 to Rs.350 per day, or Rs.9,100 per month. The central trade unions, barring the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh-affiliated Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS), have dismissed the hike as meaningless and announced that they will proceed with the strike.
This chain of events raises many questions: What is an appropriate minimum wage? How does one arrive at it? Does India still need something like a minimum wage?
Many reasons have been adduced(mention,उल्लेख) for scrapping the minimum wage. The most important one is the doxa of liberalisation, which dictates that the market and not the government should determine prices so as to preserve efficiency and competitiveness. This was the objection raised by industry and heeded by the government.
The second reason to scrap the minimum wage, especially now, is that it contradicts the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government’s flagship ‘Make in India’ initiative. For foreign capital to make in India, Indian labour has to remain cheaper than Chinese, Vietnamese, Cambodian and Bangladeshi labour.
Third is a logic that is popular among economic reformers: scrap it if it’s not working. Neither industry bodies nor the state nor unions can claim that the Minimum Wages Act (MWA) is seriously implemented. India anyway has still not ratified the United Nations’ Convention No. 131 (adopted in 1970) on Minimum Wage Fixing. So why not scrap the MWA?
Why have a minimum wage?

MWA is one of the first laws of independent India, legislated in 1948, even before we had a Constitution in place. Why was it enacted?
The real motive was to buy peace on behalf of a national bourgeoisie(capitalist,पूंजीवर्ग) that had to manage a working class that was far more militant in those days. But there were other reasons as well. India was a poor country with a major surplus of labour. There were too many jobs where labour did not have the bargaining power to demand a wage sufficient to survive on. Conditions where employers get away with paying workers too little generate several social costs, such as poverty, malnutrition, endemic(native,स्थानिक) debt leading to bonded labour, and child labour, which could be avoided through fair wages.
Three levels

The Tripartite Committee on Fair Wages, appointed in 1948, defined three different levels of wages: a living wage, a fair wage, and a minimum wage. Living wage is what a human being needs to get the basic essentials of food, shelter, clothing, protection against ill-health, security for old age, etc. A fair wage is lower than the living wage and takes into account efficiency, from the employer’s perspective. Minimum wage is similar to the fair wage except in two respects: it is even lower, and has a statutory dimension. Today, there is broad consensus
(agreement,सहमति) among patriotic businessmen and nationalist policymakers that mandating a living wage or even a fair wage for Indian workers is a ridiculous idea not worth discussing. What’s left on the table is the minimum wage. How much should it be?
The resolution passed at the 15th Indian Labour Conference in 1957 mandates taking into account five factors for calculating the minimum wage: 1. The wage must support three consumption units (individuals); 2. Food requirement of 2,700 calories a day; 3. Clothing requirement of 72 yards per worker’s family; 4. Rent for housing area similar to that provided under the subsidised housing scheme; 5. Fuel, lighting and miscellaneous items of expenditure to constitute 20 per cent of the minimum wage. In 1991, the Supreme Court called for adding another 25 per cent to the wage yielded(give,देना) by the above calculation in order to take into account children’s education, medical requirements, etc.
If calculated using these parameters, some estimates put the minimum wage at Rs.26,000 per month. This is the amount Central government employee unions are demanding from the Seventh Pay Commission, which had fixed their minimum wage at Rs.18,000.
Minimum wage via pay parity

But figures such as Rs.26,000 or even the Rs.10,000 mooted by the Labour Ministry sound fantastical in comparison to the official minimum wage in some parts of India, which can dip as low as Rs.1,650 a month (Puducherry, agriculture, 2013). Typically, the actual minimum wage is close to or less than Rs.4,800, currently the National Floor Level Minimum Wage.
Ironically enough, despite the MWA not being taken seriously by anyone, even a pro-reform government such as the one in power dare not speak of scrapping it, preferring instead to undermine it.
As A.K. Padmanabhan of the Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU) puts it, “If a government is serious about ensuring that contract workers get better wages, it would amend the Minimum Wages Act to stipulate that permanent and contract workers get the same pay for same work. But this government has not touched the Act.”
Even in post-liberalisation India, no industry lobby can openly argue that contract workers should be paid less than permanent workers for the same work. The NDA government has a brute(strict,कठोर) majority in the Lok Sabha. No party in the Rajya Sabha will oppose an amendment mandating pay parity between permanent and contract workers. So, if there is one ‘labour reform’ that can be said to have universal consensus as well as logic on its side, it is this simple amendment. In one stroke, it would raise the minimum wage of contract workers by bringing it on a par with permanent worker wages, and encourage their regularisation. But neither the United Progressive Alliance in its time nor the NDA now is interested in passing such an amendment. It is not hard to fathom why, or who benefits from this pay differential.

 courtesy:the hindu

Sunday, September 4, 2016

A city is for all its citizens


“Universal” is a tricky word. It has an enormous(large,विशाल) appeal, an unquestioned romance of taking everyone along. Universal human rights, universal access to basic services, housing for all. It is the barometer of inclusion done right. The dark side of the romance is that it’s one of the hardest things to achieve. Often the “universal” is a vanishing(disappear,गायब) horizon and, like all horizons, the mirage is what makes you lose sight of the very real trade-offs and constraints in your way.
This week the Delhi Jal Board (DJB) announced a new horizon towards the idea of universal access to a basic urban service and human need: water. The “Jal Adhikar Connection” (a Right to Water Connection) promises to let households within slums in Delhi apply for legal, metered water connections “irrespective of the status of their residence.” This move — following the Government of Delhi’s already given pledge(promise,वादा) to extend water and sanitation services to unauthorised colonies — implies that legal, public and metered water could (like electricity) actually cover the city as it exists rather than as it is imagined in plans and laws.
The city is what it is

It is critical to emphasise how important this is. In Indian cities, one of the biggest blocks to any imagination of “universal” or “inclusive” development is not lack of money, land or technology as is so often imagined. It is that a large number of our fellow urban residents are not considered urban residents at all — they are not part of the “universe” to be reached. The grounds of their exclusion are particular to the way our cities have been built. For multiple reasons, Indian cities are largely auto-constructed. Put simply: they have been built not by the intentions of planners or architects but by people themselves. From the slum to the unauthorised colony, the historical urban village trying to change its identity to the new peri-urban development, each neighbourhood has some kind of tension with law and planning. In Delhi’s last reliable statistic on this in 2000, only 24 per cent of the city lived in a “planned colony.” Everyone else, nearly three-fourths of the city, lived or lives some distance from this legal and planned norm. It is now well argued that this “illegality” is not one most of these residents perform to seek personal gains; it is simply the only way in the context of state and market failures to find a way to make life in the city. As activists have long argued: when three-fourths of a people find themselves violating law, it is the law itself that is broken.
“Spatial illegality” has been a critical — and deeply under-recognised — part of what has broken the possibility of universal access to basic services in our cities. As the rules have changed over time, utilities like the DJB have been, at worst, prohibited from giving legal water connections in “illegal” slums and “unauthorised” colonies, or, at best, such provision has been left to discretion(sense,विवेक), the dreaded(fearful,भयानक) “may” rather than “shall” of public policy. In multiple legal challenges, courts have refused to acknowledge the urban right to water citing spatial illegality even if this leaves the basic needs of thousands unmet, their dignity denied.
The irony is that even those who defend such exclusions do not fully realise the cost they themselves pay for them. Partly as a result of spatial illegality, our city’s infrastructure is not a network or a system. It is a set of fragmented(break,खंडित)splinters. It struggles to move to its horizon, reaching one colony but bypassing the other, reaching one now and making the other wait, trying to navigate a geography not of demand and supply but of varied degrees of legality and legitimacy. Who gets infrastructure and when thus become matters of power and patronage, reproducing social inequalities in the space of the city.
Not only does this mean that rights and entitlements are conditioned on where you live in the city, it also means that DJB chief Kapil Mishra is absolutely right when he says that without expanding access more “universally,” the DJB can build neither a scientific system nor an efficient one. Infrastructure systems are just that: systems. They need scale and connectivity to be economically viable and technically sound. The DJB’s financial health and self-sufficiency will gain enormously when thousands of new households give revenue to the public utility instead of to tankers and private suppliers. Its pipelines will map, connect and function — their geographies seeking to reach rather than bypass, connect rather than fragment. Wastage will reduce, efficiencies will rise. There are good models to learn from here. When the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board introduced a category of “shared taps” to precisely(clearly,स्पस्थ्तया) open up water connections into slums, it saw its financial health improve alongside the improvements in the city’s overall indicators of health, work, housing quality and poverty. When Ahmedabad gave networked infrastructure to its slums, overall indicators of access slowly rose for the city as a whole.
Yet herein lies the first danger of taking an important move and losing ourselves in a mirage well before the horizon is near. Technical and economic efficiency are necessary and pivotal(crucial,निर्णायक) reasons to want to make access to water universal but are not, they must not be, sufficient ones. In an auto-constructed city where spatial illegality breaks access to basic rights, expanding the right to water must be a part of a larger effort to expand the right to the city itself.
The city planner’s public

Ambedkar once said that a Hindu’s public is just his caste. An Indian city’s public is too often just the legal, planned colony. The graded inequalities that follow between this imagined ideal and all other ways of inhabiting the city are real. The exclusions are simultaneously socially performed, legally enshrined, and economically reproduced. Recognising the right to water — it is a jal adhikar connection — must be the first step in taking on the spatial illegality that urban residents have been forced into and then held accountable for. It must begin to return to the Indian city its actual universal, its actual publics, to all of its residents. For this, we must begin at the most fundamental of all claims: to be recognised as being in the city, to be acknowledged, and to be valued as workers, citizens and bearers of rights rather than just the “poor,” “slum dwellers” or “encroachers.” What Delhi must do now is to stand by its Jal Board that has taken a first and important step to live up to being and becoming a truly public utility.

courtesy:the hindu